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FEDERAL LAW IN STATE SUPREME 
COURTS 
Daniel J. Meador* 
The growth of federal law during the middle and late twentieth 
century and the consequent increase of litigation are well-known 
phenomena of American legal life. Whenever Congress extends fed-
eral law into new fields or creates new federal rights or liabilities it 
sets the stage for more litigation. Supreme Court decisions giving 
fresh interpretations to constitutional and statutory provisions like-
wise stimulate judicial business. Many commentators have dis-
cussed the profound effects of this increase in litigation on all levels 
of the federal judiciary-the district courts, the courts of appeals, 
and the Supreme Court. However, little attention has been paid to 
the impact on state courts of this growth in federal law. Under-
standing more precisely the involvement of state courts with federal 
law is not merely a matter of academic interest; this involvement 
has important ramifications affecting the jurisdictional and struc-
tural relationships of federal and state courts. 
Only one serious effort has been made to measure the role of 
federal law in state court adjudication. That study was completed 
in 1981 by the National Center for State Courts. Its key findings 
are summarized in the first part below. To supplement that study I 
have procured more recent data from other states, summarized in 
the second part. In the third section I identify some of the signifi-
cant consequences for the American judiciary of increased federal 
law involvement in the work of state courts. 
FEDERAL LAW IN FOUR STATE SUPREME COURTS: 
1959 AND 1979 
The National Center study focused on the Supreme Courts of 
four states: California, Connecticut, Illinois, and Virginia. The ob-
jective was to determine the extent to which federal law was in-
volved in the decisions of those four courts in 1959, and then twenty 
years later in 1979.1 Research was confined to the opinions of the 
• James Monroe Professor of Law, University of Virginia. 
I. Comparison of Federal Legal Influences on State Supreme Court Decisions in 1959 
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states' highest courts because that is where the federal law elements 
could most readily be identified. The authors assumed that the ex-
tent of federal law involvement in state supreme court decisions 
provides at least a rough measure of federal law involvement in all 
state court litigation. In any event, the impact of state court adjudi-
cation on the work of the United States Supreme Court is deter-
mined almost entirely by state supreme court decisions involving 
federal law and not by litigation in the lower state courts. 
Federal law can be involved in state supreme court opinions in 
two ways: (1) the state supreme court can squarely decide a ques-
tion of federal law, or (2) the court, when deciding a state law ques-
tion, can look to federal law analogies or to persuasive reasoning in 
federal court opinions. The National Center study attempted to 
identify each of these kinds of federal law involvement in the opin-
ions it surveyed. Without going into the details of that study, it 
suffices here to say that in the four state supreme courts federal law 
was involved in one way or another in 14% of the cases in 1959 and 
42% of the cases in 1979.2 This represents a three-fold growth in 
the extent of federal law involvement in state adjudication during 
that twenty-year period. However, the amount of such growth va-
ried from one state to another and between civil and criminal cases 
within the same state. 
Table 1, compiled from data in the National Center study, 
presents the key figures for each state. The figures in this table are 
the percentages of the courts' opinions involving federal law in rela-
tion to the total number of the courts' opinions in each category 
shown. 
Perhaps the two most striking facts revealed by this table are 
these: (1) in both civil and criminal cases the supreme court in each 
state experienced a significant twenty-year growth in the amount of 
federal law with which it had to deal and (2) the increase of federal 
law in criminal cases was far greater than it was in civil cases. In-
deed, in Connecticut only a small percentage of criminal cases lack 
federal elements. These statistics substantiate the widespread view 
that in many respects the state criminal process has become federal-
ized as a result of the United States Supreme Court's decisions 
under the fourteenth amendment. It should be underscored that 
these figures reflect all degrees of federal law involvement in these 
and 1979, Legislation For The Improvement of The Judiciary: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Courts of the Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 293 (1982) (this 
study was funded by the Federal Justice Research Program administered by the former Office 
for Improvements in the Administration of Justice of the U.S. Department of Justice) [here-
inafter cited as NCSC Study]. 
2. NCSC Study, supra, at 296. 
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TABLE 1 
FEDERAL LAW IN STATE SUPREME COURTS, 
1959 AND 1979 
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Civil Criminal All Cases 
1959 1979 1959 1979 1959 1979 
California 16.2% 46.7% 28.8% 72.8% 20.1 o/o 58.6% 
Connecticut 7.2% 31.9% 31.2% 93.5% 10.3% 45.4% 
Illinois 17.4% 24.7% 14.6% 70.5% 16.5% 37.4% 
Virginia 3.4% 14.5% 17.6% 54.7% 5.3% 27.1 o/o 
state supreme court decisions; the percentage of opinions in which 
federal questions were squarely decided-and hence potentially re-
viewable by the Supreme Court-was smaller, although still 
significant. 
SEVEN STATE SUPREME COURTS: 1983 
To obtain similar data from other states, and to provide more 
recent information, I employed law students to survey the 1983 
opinions of the supreme courts of seven states: Arizona, Colorado, 
Georgia, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, and Ohio.3 These 
states are diverse geographically, in size, and in the nature of their 
populations and judicial business. All except Mississippi have inter-
mediate appellate courts. 
The results of my study, shown in Table 2, reveal substantial 
variation in the impact of federal law in the various states. The 
least involvement is in Minnesota with 28% and the greatest is in 
New Jersey with 69%. The National Center study showed a range 
in 1979 from 27.1% in Virginia to 58.6% in California.4 The over-
all percentage in the four states surveyed in 1979 was 41%, whereas 
the overall percentage in the seven states surveyed in 1983 was 
49%. 
3. Each opinion was analyzed to determine whether the court actually decided a ques-
tion of federal law or whether the court simply cited or referred to federal law in some fash-
ion but without squarely deciding any federal question. It is not always clear, of course, 
whether a federal question is actually being decided, and there is sometimes room for differ-
ences of interpretation and judgment. Because of that circumstance and because these judg-
ments were being made by law students, it is possible that the figures are not completely 
accurate. However, errors are not likely to affect significantly the overall statistical pattern. 
4. The figures in this column were obtained through a combination of published re-
ports and information provided to the author by the state court administrators. 
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TABLE 2 
STATE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS INVOLVING 
FEDERAL LAW, 1983 
Total Opinions 
Opinions Opinions Opinions Not 
Deciding Citing Involving Involving 
Total Federal Federal Federal Federal 
State Opinions5 Questions Law Law Law 
Arizona 137 52 (38%) 34 (25%) 86 (63%) 51 (37%) 
Colorado 221 68 (31%) 53 (24%) 121 (55%) 100 (45%) 
Georgia 331 122 (37%) 21 ( 7%) 143 (44%) 188 (56%) 
Minnesota 332 57 (17%) 38 (II%) 95 (28%) 237 (72%) 
Mississippi 219 46 (22%) 66 (31%) 112 (52%) 107 (48%) 
New Jersey 75 30 (40%) 22 (29%) 52 (69%) 23(31%) 
Ohio 252 28 (II%) 55 (22%) 83 (33%) 169 (67%) 
Table 2 also shows that in 1983 in some states federal law was 
involved mainly by way of citation rather than by way of square 
decision. In Ohio, for example, federal questions were decided in 
only half as many cases as those in which federal law was merely 
cited. Mississippi also exhibited this pattern. In other states the 
cases in which federal law was decided outnumbered those in which 
it was merely cited. The most extreme illustration of this pattern 
was Georgia: 37% of its opinions decided federal questions, 
whereas federal law was merely cited in only 7%. That pattern sug-
gests that some state courts look to federal law when required to do 
so in order to decide a federal question, but otherwise pay relatively 
little attention to it. 
Perhaps the most striking fact overall shown by Table 2 is that 
four of these seven state supreme courts decided federal questions in 
nearly a third or more of all cases. The Ohio Supreme Court, in 
which only 11% of the opinions decided federal questions, appears 
to be unusual. 
Table 3 takes the opinions in which federal questions were ac-
tually decided (the second column in Table 2) and classifies them 
into three categories: civil, criminal, and postconviction. 
Realistically, the figures for criminal cases should be combined 
with those for post-conviction cases because the latter (although 
civil in theory) involve a review of criminal proceedings. Viewed 
that way, the data shown here confirm the widespread assumption 
that federal questions in state courts appear mainly in criminal 
5. NCSC Study, supra note I, at 296. 
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TABLE 3 
STATE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS DECIDING 
FEDERAL QUESTIONS, 1983 
State Total Civil Criminal Postconviction 
Arizona 52 8 (15%) 44 (85%) 0 ( 0%) 
Colorado 68 15 (22%) 45 (66%) 8 (12%) 
Georgia 122 17(14%) 90 (74%) 15 (12%) 
Minnesota 57 24 (42%) 31 (54%) 2 ( 4%) 
Mississippi 46 20 (43%) 21 (46%) 5(11%) 
New Jersey 30 15 (50%) 14 (47%) I ( 3%) 
Ohio 28 14 (50%) 12 (43%) 2 ( 7%) 
cases. New Jersey and Ohio are the only exceptions; in those two 
states federal law appears equally in civil and criminal litigation. 
In compiling the data on federal questions actually decided, we 
identified the nature of each such question. Table 4, set out in an 
appendix, lists the federal questions by the constitutional provision 
or doctrine involved and by reference to the federal statute in-
volved. Not surprisingly, constitutional questions far outnumbered 
statutory questions. As Table 4 shows, during 1983 these seven 
state supreme courts collectively decided a total of 535 federal con-
stitutional law questions, but they decided only thirty-two issues 
under federal statutes. These federal statutory questions arose 
under twenty-seven different acts of Congress. It seems clear that 
no single federal legislative enactment depends heavily on state 
courts for its enforcement. However, state courts do form an im-
portant part of the judicial machinery for interpreting and applying 
the Federal Constitution. 
RAMIFICATIONS 
The National Center study showed a three-fold increase of fed-
eral law in state supreme court decisions between 1959 and 1979. 
The 1983 data set out above show that there has been no diminution 
since 1979 and that indeed the involvement of federal law in state 
supreme court opinions may be continuing to grow. In the seven 
states surveyed in 1983, federal law was involved in 49% of the 
cases and federal questions were actually decided in 28% of all of 
the opinions. What are the ramifications of this situation? 
U.S. Supreme Court Docket 
Consider first the docket of the United States Supreme Court. 
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Concern about the Court's workload in recent years has focused on 
the increasing difficulties encountered by the Justices in monitoring 
the work of the thirteen United States courts of appeals. What is 
often slighted in these discussions is the fact that the Supreme Court 
must also act as a court of last resort on federal questions for the 
fifty state court systems, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. 
Statistics are not currently available to show the total number of 
decisions rendered annually by these fifty-two jurisdictions, but it is 
clear that the number runs high into the thousands. If the data 
derived from the seven states surveyed in 1983 present a reasonably 
accurate picture for the nation as a whole, more than a quarter of 
those opinions would involve decisions on questions of federal law, 
thereby opening the way for Supreme Court review. This means 
that a very substantial pool of potential Supreme Court business is 
being generated by the fifty-two non-federal court systems. 
According to statistics supplied by the Office of the Clerk of 
the Supreme Court, during the 1981 Term 1,255 cases were brought 
to that Court from the fifty state systems, the District of Columbia, 
and Puerto Rico. During the 1983 Term there were 1,095 such 
cases.6 These cases represent over a quarter of all filings in the 
Supreme Court for those terms. If federal law involvement contin-
ues to rise in state court business, these filings will increase. In any 
event, the substantial amount of state court adjudication of federal 
law must be taken into account in considering the Supreme Court's 
workload problem and related proposals for reforms. 
Writing State Supreme Court Opinions 
The Court's workload is affected by the manner in which state 
court opinions are written. This is because the way in which the 
state opinion employs federal law determines whether the state deci-
sion is reviewable by the United States Supreme Court. The classic 
rule is that a state court decision will be reviewable only if the state 
court actually decides a question of federal law and if that federal 
question is controlling in the case. Mere discussion and citation of 
federal law will not make the decision reviewable. This gives the 
state court judges a measure of control over the reviewability of 
their decisions. In some cases it is possible for the state judges to 
draft an opinion disposing of the case without resting the decision 
on federal law, even though the parties' arguments stressed federal 
issues. 
6. These figures for the 1981 and 1983 Tenns were supplied informally to the author 
by the Clerk of the Supreme Court. 
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The Supreme Court's decision in Michigan v. Long7 has height-
ened the importance of careful attention to the drafting of opinions 
by state supreme court judges. Under that decision a state court 
case is reviewable by the Supreme Court if the state opinion dis-
cusses federal questions without making it crystal clear that the de-
cision is being rested solely on a state law ground. With federal law 
now involved in so much state court litigation, the judges of the 
state supreme courts have more opportunity than ever before to 
craft their opinions in a way that will control their reviewability in 
the Supreme Court. In some cases the state judges may want their 
decisions to be reviewable; in others, they may not. Whatever their 
view on this matter, they are today being much more frequently 
confronted with the problem than in decades gone by, when federal 
law played a smaller part in state court work. 
New Structures for Federal Appellate 
Review of State Decisions 
Since the early 1970's efforts have been underway to devise 
means of overcoming the two difficulties besetting the federal judi-
cial structure at the top: (1) the overload on the Supreme Court, 
which renders it difficult for the Justices to give adequate attention 
to the important questions with which they should deal, and (2) the 
inability of the federal appellate structure as a whole to deliver the 
number of decisions with nationwide binding effect necessary to 
maintain uniformity in the administration of federal law. If the vol-
ume of litigation continues to grow, as is likely, and the percentage 
of federal law questions in state court litigation remains high or in-
creases, the business generated by these fifty-two jurisdictions will 
make it increasingly difficult for the Supreme Court alone to moni-
tor the administration of federal law in those courts. Thus, in 
thinking about solutions for these problems, it would be well to bear 
specifically in mind the state court component of the Supreme 
Court's work and to think about restructuring the federal appellate 
system to provide a means for maintaining evenhandedness among 
these non-federal tribunals. 
Among the various new devices that have been discussed in 
recent years, the idea of employing the U.S. courts of appeal to re-
view state decisions on federal questions deserves renewed consider-
ation in light of this study. This idea is as old as the republic. 
Hamilton noted the possibility in the 82nd Federalist: 
I perceive at present no impediment to the establishment of an appeal from the state 
7. 463 u.s. 1032 (1983). 
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courts to the subordinate national tribunals; and many advantages attending the 
power of doing it may be imagined. It would diminish the motives to the multipli-
cation of federal courts, and would admit of arrangements calculated to contract 
the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court. The state tribunals may then be left 
with a more entire charge of federal causes; and appeals in most cases in which they 
may be deemed proper instead of being carried to the supreme court, may be made 
to lie from the state courts, to district courts of the union. 
There are various ways in which state cases could be routed to the 
regional federal appellate courts. One is simply to vest jurisdiction 
in those courts to review all state decisions in which a controlling 
question of federal law has been decided. In other words, this 
would transfer the present Supreme Court jurisdiction over state 
decisions to the regional federal appellate courts. Supreme Court 
review would remain available through certiorari after the regional 
appellate court decision. This arrangement would, of course, in-
crease the caseload for each of the twelve geographical federal cir-
cuits. However, the increase for each would not be unmanageable, 
although a few additional circuit judgeships might be necessary to 
deal with this added business. The main effect of this change would 
be to provide a more meaningful federal appellate review of state 
court decisions on federal law, thereby increasing the federal judici-
ary's capacity to maintain nationwide uniformity in the administra-
tion of federal law. Of course, discrepancies might arise, as they do 
now, among the twelve courts of appeals, but the Supreme Court, 
relieved of responsibility for reviewing fifty state courts (plus the 
District of Columbia and Puerto Rico), would be in a better posi-
tion to monitor the federal appellate courts. 
Another possibility would be to vest the regional appellate 
courts with jurisdiction to review state supreme court decisions in 
criminal cases only.s As the data from the two studies here show, 
federal law plays a much larger role, generally speaking, in criminal 
cases than it does in civil. In criminal cases the overall percentage 
involving federal law from the four states in 1979 was 72%; in the 
seven states in 1983 it was 59%. One might argue that uniformity 
is more important in the administration of criminal justice, particu-
larly in the areas covered by constitutional rules, than in the miscel-
laneous assortment of civil litigation that involves federal law. In 
any event the criminal volume is greater, and there is thus a practi-
cal need for a greater federal appellate capacity. Again, the federal 
circuit decisions on these federal law questions would be reviewable 
on certiorari by the Supreme Court. This arrangement would leave 
8. This idea is explained in Meador, Straightening Out Federal Review of State Crimi-
nal Cases, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 273 (1983). 
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civil cases reviewable directly from the state supreme courts in the 
U.S. Supreme Court. 
Whatever arrangements one may prefer, the point is that seri-
ous thought needs to be given to providing a greater federal appel-
late capacity to monitor the large and growing percentage of federal 
questions being dealt with by the fifty-two non-federal judicial sys-
tems of the nation. 
Federal Funding for State Courts 
Until well after the middle of the twentieth century the idea 
that the federal government should assist in funding the courts of 
the states would have been viewed as heretical, if not unconstitu-
tional. However, beginning in the 1960's federal funds began to be 
channeled to the state courts as part of the "war on crime" that 
gripped the country at that time. Since then it has become generally 
accepted that it is appropriate for federal funding to be employed to 
improve the state judicial systems. With the creation by Congress 
of the State Justice Institute in 1984, such funding has now been 
institutionalized on a permanent basis.9 The purpose of the Insti-
tute will be to provide several million dollars annually to improve 
the courts of the several states. One of the major reasons justifying 
such federal financial support is that the state courts, in addition to 
handling most of the nation's adjudication, perform a large role in 
the enforcement of federal law. Inasmuch as such a significant por-
tion of state judicial manpower is devoted to federal purposes, it is 
not inappropriate that federal funding assist those judicial systems 
in developing more effective procedures and in bringing into service 
the most advanced technology. 
Reallocation of Jurisdiction Over Federal Cases 
One of the features of American federalism that makes our law 
confusing and litigation complicated and expensive is the coexis-
tence of two judicial systems-one state and one federal. We have 
state trial courts and federal trial courts sitting side by side with 
concurrent jurisdiction over many cases. Much of the federal law 
involvement in state courts occurs in cases over which federal trial 
courts also have jurisdiction. Our legal system would be simplified 
if, in many of these situations, exclusive jurisdiction were vested in 
either a state trial court or a federal district court. 
Whenever exclusive jurisdiction over federal cases is discussed, 
9. State Justice Institute Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3336 (1984). The 
Institute did not begin functioning until its Board of Directors was appointed in 1986. 
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attention focuses mainly on the possibility of vesting such jurisdic-
tion in the federal district courts. However, since state courts are 
already adjudicating a significant proportion of federal issues, per-
haps they should be given even more federal law cases and jurisdic-
tion should be exclusive. Truth-in-lending and FELA cases are two 
examples of fields where this might be done. A move in that direc-
tion would require an important policy decision by Congress. Such 
a choice may become increasingly attractive as the volume of litiga-
tion in the federal district courts continues to rise and as there is 
continuing pressure for even more federal judgeships. Transferring 
some of that jurisdiction to the state courts, where the judges are 
already heavily engaged in adjudicating federal law, may be an at-
tractive option for Congress to consider, especially when it creates 
new federal statutory rights. The option may become even more 
attractive when one recalls that Congress is already channeling fed-
eral money to the state courts and will continue to do so indefinitely 
through the State Justice Institute. Vesting certain federal question 
cases exclusively in the state courts would, of course, justify even 
more federal funding for the state courts, but this would probably 
be cheaper than additional federal judgeships and personnel for the 
federal courts. 
Support for exclusive state jurisdiction over some federal cases 
might come from those who perceive distinct disadvantages in an 
ever-expanding federal judiciary. There is a deeply held notion that 
the federal courts should remain relatively small and should be re-
served for matters of special federal concern. Many of the federal 
law questions being adjudicated by state courts are not of that sort, 
and giving those courts exclusive jurisdiction would impair no ma-
jor national interest. The more federal law business that the state 
courts take on, however, the greater will be the need for a revised 
federal appellate structure to prevent nonuniformity. If the federal 
appellate capacity is enlarged-for example, by authorizing the 
courts of appeals to review state judgments-"The state tribunals 
may then be left with a more entire charge of federal causes," as 
Hamilton put it in the 82nd Federalist. Thus, these concerns are all 
related: the volume of federal law in state court litigation, the ex-
clusivity of such state court jurisdiction, the federal appellate struc-
ture, and the federal funding of state courts. 
The two surveys described here are merely illustrative of the 
kinds of inventories that should be run annually on a more precise 
basis in all of the states. It is clear that federal law now plays an 
important, regular part in state court adjudication. We need to 
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measure that phenomenon more precisely in order to decide how 
best to arrange the totality of state-federal judicial business in the 
United States. 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE 4 
STATE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS- NATURE OF 
FEDERAL QUESTIONS DECIDED, 1983 
Federal Question AZ co GA MN MS NJ OH 
CONSTITUTIONAL (Total) 91 83 191 66 42 36 26 
Burden of Proof/Sufficiency of Evidence 3 2 67 3 
Civil Commitment 2 
Commerce Clause I 
Confessions/ Miranda II 2 2 I 
Confrontation Clause 6 2 2 3 
Contract Clause 2 I 
Death Sentences 16 7 3 
Double Jeopardy 4 6 3 2 2 2 3 
Effective Assistance of Counsel 5 8 2 
Eighth Amendmen !/Sentencing 2 2 2 3 
Eminent Domain I 2 I 4 2 
Ex Post Facto 2 
Fair Trial 2 2 2 
First Amendment 4 I 3 5 3 2 
Full Faith & Credit 2 I 
Grand Jury Proceedings 2 2 
Guilty Pleas 3 2 
Identification 2 2 4 7 
Jury Impartiality 2 
Misc. Due Process/Equal Protection 7 21 45 16 10 7 8 
Overbreadth!V agueness II 4 2 
Parole Revocation 2 
Privileges & Immunities I I 
Right to Counsel 5 3 II 3 2 
Right to Jury 5 
Search & Seizure 10 18 10 17 7 7 
Self-Incrimination 7 5 8 3 
Speedy Trial 3 
Supremacy Clause I 
STATUTORY (Total) 4 2 5 5 10 2 4 
Bank Holding Company Act 
Bankruptcy Act 
Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983) 
Civil Rights Attys. Fees Award Act 
Environmental Regs. 
Equal Pay Act 
Farm Credit Act 
Federal Arbitration Act 2 
Federal Credit Union Act 
FELA 
Federal Parole Commission & 
Reorganization Act 
Fishery Conservation & Management Act 
FRCP 26(b) 
Gam. St. Germain Depository lnst. Act of 
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TABLE 4 (CONTINUED) 
Federal Question 
1982 
Interstate Commerce Act 
Jones Act 
Judiciary & Judicial Procedure - Interest 
(28 u.s.c. § 1961) 
Labor-Management Reporting Act 
Omnibus Crime Control & Safe Streets Act 
Rules of Decision Act 
Sherman Act 
Shipping & Vessels Regulation 
(46 u.s.c. § 262, 319, 911) 
State Juris. over Indians 
Truth-in-Lending Act 
Urban Mass Transportation Act 
Voting Rights Act 
Water Rights Suits Act 
AZ CO GA MN MS NJ OH 
